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The conduct of monetary policy in terms of interest rate or other 
rules has been extensively studied in recent research.1 This literature 
gives a central role to forecasts of future inflation and output, and 
the question of whether monetary policy should be forward-looking 
has been subject to discussion and debate. The Bank of England 
and the European Central Bank include private sector forecasts and 
internal macroeconomic projections in their periodic reports (Bank of 
England, 2007; European Central Bank, 2007). Empirical evidence 
on Germany, Japan, and the United States since 1979 similarly 
suggests that central banks are forward-looking in practice (Clarida, 
Galí, and Gertler, 1998).
The rational expectations hypothesis, the standard benchmark in 
macroeconomics since the seminal work of Lucas (1976) and Sargent 
and Wallace (1975), has been employed in most of the research 
on monetary policy and interest rate rules. The most common 
formulation of the rational expectations hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that both private agents and the policymaker know 
the true model of the economy, except for unforecastable random
1. Woodford (2003) is a monumental treatise on the subject, while Walsh (2003) 
provides an accessible graduate-level treatment. For surveys, see Clarida, Galí, and 
Gertler (1999) and McCallum (1999).
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shocks.2 The rational expectations assumption is excessively strong: 
neither private agents nor policymakers have perfect knowledge of 
the economy. In reality, economists formulate and estimate models 
that are used to make macroeconomic forecasts and carry out policy 
analysis. These models are reestimated and possibly reformulated 
as new data become available. In other words, economists engage 
in learning processes about the economy as they attempt to improve 
their knowledge of the economy.
Formal study of these learning processes and their implications 
for macroeconomic dynamics and policymaking are becoming an 
increasingly important line of research in macroeconomics.3 This 
research is based on a principle of cognitive consistency stating that 
private agents and policymakers in the economy behave like applied 
economists and econometricians. It is thus postulated that expectations 
of macroeconomic variables are formed by using statistical or other 
formal forecasting models and procedures.
An important policy question is whether the learning processes 
create new tasks and constraints for macroeconomic policy. An 
affirmative answer to this question has been demonstrated by the 
recent work on learning and monetary policy.4 This view is also 
reflected in recent speeches by two prominent central bank governors 
(see Trichet, 2005; Bernanke, 2007). This research shows that interest 
rate setting by monetary policymakers faces two fundamental 
problems. First, some of the proposed interest rate rules may not 
perform well when agents’ expectations are out of equilibrium. The 
consequences of errors in forecasting, and the resulting correction 
mechanisms, may create instability in the economy. For (usually 
suboptimal) instrument rules, Bullard and Mitra (2002) consider 
the stability of the rational expectations equilibrium when monetary 
policy is conducted using variants of the Taylor rule. These rules 
work well only under certain parameter restrictions, and Bullard and 
Mitra suggest that monetary policymaking should take into account 
the learnability constraints on the parameters of policy behavior. For 
2. Some papers do extend the standard notion of rational expectations equilibrium 
to an equilibrium with limited information. These extensions often assume that economic 
agents do not observe some variables but know the structure of the economy.
3. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) provide a treatise on the analysis of adaptive 
learning and its implications in macroeconomics. Evans and Honkapohja (1995, 1999), 
Marimon (1997), and Sargent (1993, 1999) provide surveys of the field.
4. Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) and Bullard (2006) provide surveys of the recent 
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optimal monetary policy, Evans and Honkapohja (2003c, 2006) show 
that certain standard forms of optimal interest rate setting by the 
central bank can lead to expectational instability, as economic agents 
unsuccessfully try to correct their forecast functions over time. Evans 
and Honkapohja also propose a new rule for implementing optimal 
policy that always leads to stability under learning.
Second, monetary policy rules, including some formulations for 
optimal setting of the instrument and some Taylor rules based on 
forecasts of inflation and the output gap, can create multiple equilibria, 
also called indeterminacy of equilibria.5 Under indeterminacy there 
are multiple, even continua of rational expectations equilibria and the 
economy need not settle on the desired equilibrium. The possible rest 
points have been studied using stability under learning as a selection 
criterion (see Honkapohja and Mitra, 2004; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 
2004; Evans and McGough, 2005a). Indeterminacy is not a critical 
problem if the fundamental rational expectations equilibrium is the 
only stable equilibrium under learning. Moreover, indeterminacy need 
not arise if the forward-looking interest rate rule is carefully designed, 
as shown by Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Evans and Honkapohja 
(2003c, 2006). The central message from these studies is that monetary 
policy has important new tasks when agents’ knowledge is imperfect 
and agents try to improve their knowledge through learning. Policy 
should be designed to facilitate learning by private agents so that 
expectations do not create instability in the economy.
Recently, many further aspects of expectations, learning, and 
monetary policy have been analyzed in the rapidly expanding 
literature. In this paper, we provide a nontechnical overview of 
this research program. The first part of the paper reviews the basic 
theoretical results. We then take up some immediate practical 
concerns that can arise in connection with rules for interest rate 
setting, including issues of observability in connection with private 
forecasts and with current output and inflation data. A second concern 
is the knowledge of the structure of the economy that is required to 
implement optimal interest rate policies. The second part of the paper 
provides an overview of the recent and ongoing developments in the 
literature. We first summarize research on learnability of rational 
expectations equilibria when the basic New-Keynesian model is 
5. This was first noted by Bernanke and Woodford (1997), Woodford (1999b), and 
Svensson and Woodford (2005). The problem was systematically explored for Taylor 
rules by Bullard and Mitra (2002).30 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
extended to incorporate further features of the economy. We then 
discuss four topics of applied interest in more detail: policy design 
under perpetual learning, estimated models with learning, recurrent 
hyperinflations, and macroeconomic policy to combat liquidity traps 
and deflation.
1. The Model
We conduct our discussion using the New-Keynesian model that 
has become the workhorse in the analysis of monetary policy, and 
we directly employ its linearized version. The original nonlinear 
framework is based on a representative consumer and a continuum of 
firms producing differentiated goods under monopolistic competition. 
Nominal stickiness of prices arises from firms’ constraints on the 
frequency of price changes, as originally suggested by Calvo (1983).
The behavior of the private sector is summarized by two 
equations: 
xt = −ϕ (it − Et
*πt+1) + Et
*xt+1 + gt,   (1)
which is the IS curve derived from the Euler equation for consumer 
optimization, and 
πt = λxt + βEt
*πt+1 + ut,   (2)
which is the price setting rule for the monopolistically competitive 
firms, often called the New-Keynesian Phillips or aggregate supply 
curve.
Here xt and πt denote the output gap and inflation rate for period 
t, respectively, and it is the nominal interest rate, expressed as the 
deviation from the steady state real interest rate. The determination of 
it is discussed below. Private sector expectations of the output gap and 
inflation in the next period are denoted Et
*xt+1 and Et
*πt+1, respectively. 
Since our focus is on learning behavior, these expectations need not be 
rational (Et without * denotes rational expectations). The parameters 
ϕ and λ are positive and β is the discount factor with 0 < β < 1.
For brevity, we do not discuss details of the derivation of equations 
(1) and (2), which is based on individual Euler equations under 
(identical) subjective expectations, together with aggregation and 
definitions of the variables. The Euler equations for the current period 
give the decisions as functions of the expected state in the next period. 31 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
Rules for forecasting the next period’s values of the state variables 
are the other ingredient in the description of individual behavior. We 
assume that given forecasts, private agents make decisions according 
to the Euler equations.6
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0 < µ < 1, 0 < ρ < 1, and   gt ~ i.i.d. (0, σg
2),  ut ~ i.i.d. (0, σu
2) are independent 
white noise. In addition, gt represents shocks to government purchases 
or potential output (or both), and ut represents any cost push shocks 
to marginal costs other than those entering through xt. For simplicity, 
we assume throughout the paper that µ and ρ are known (if not, they 
could be estimated).
The model is closed by an equation describing the central bank’s 
interest rate setting.7 One approach examines instrument rules, under 
which it is directly specified in terms of key macroeconomic variables 
without explicit policy optimization. A prominent example of this type 
is the standard Taylor (1993) rule, that is, 
i x tt t t =+ −+ ππ π 05 05 .( ). ,
where π is the target level of inflation and the target level of the 
output gap is zero. (Recall that it is specified net of the real interest 
rate, which in the standard Taylor rule is usually set at 2 percent). 
6. This kind of behavior is boundedly rational, but in our view reasonable, since 
agents attempt to meet the margin of optimality between the current and the next 
period. Other models of bounded rationality are possible. Preston (2005, 2006) proposes 
a formulation in which long horizons matter in individual behavior.
7. We follow the common practice of leaving hidden the government budget 
constraint and the equation for the evolution of government debt. This is acceptable 
provided that fiscal policy appropriately accommodates the consequences of monetary 
policy for the government budget constraint. The interaction of monetary and fiscal 
policy can be important for the stability of equilibria under learning; see Evans and 
Honkapohja (2007), McCallum (2003), and Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008). We 
discuss some aspects of the interaction below.32 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
More generally, Taylor rules are of the form it = χ0 + χππt + χxxt. For 
convenience (and without loss of generality), we take the inflation 
target to be π = 0, so that this class of rules takes the form 
it = χππt + χxxt,   (4)
where χπ, χx > 0. Variations of the Taylor rule replace πt and xt by 
lagged values or by forecasts of current or future values.
Alternatively, interest rate policy can be derived explicitly to 
maximize a policy objective function. This is frequently taken to be 
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where π is the inflation target. This type of optimal policy is often 
called flexible inflation targeting in the current literature (see, for 
example, Svensson, 1999, 2003). The policymaker is assumed to have 
the same discount factor, β, as the private sector, while α is the relative 
weight placed by the policymaker on the output target. The case of 
α = 0 represents strict inflation targeting. The loss function (5) can 
alternatively be viewed as a quadratic approximation to the welfare 
function of a representative agent.8
The literature on optimal policy under rational expectations 
distinguishes between optimal discretionary policy, in which the 
policymaker is unable to commit to policies for future periods, 
and optimal policy in which such commitment is possible. Under 
commitment, the policymaker can do better because of the effect 
on private expectations, but commitment policy exhibits time 
inconsistency, in the sense that policymakers would have an incentive 
to deviate from the policy in the future. Assuming that the policy has 
been initiated at some point in the past (the timeless perspective 
described by Woodford, 1999a), and setting π = 0, the first-order 
condition specifies 
λπt + α(xt – xt–1) = 0   (6)
in every period.
8. See Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999; Woodford, 2003. In this formulation, α is 
a function of various deep structural parameters in the fully microfounded version of 
the model.33 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
Condition (6) for optimal policy with commitment is not a complete 
specification of monetary policy, since one must also provide a reaction 
function for it that implements the policy. A number of interest rate 
rules are consistent with the model described in equations (1) and (2), 
the optimality condition (6), and rational expectations. However, some 
ways of implementing optimal monetary policy can make the economy 
vulnerable to either indeterminacy or expectational instability or both, 
while other implementations are robust to these difficulties.
We will consider fundamentals-based and expectations-based 
rules. The basic fundamentals-based rule depends only on the 
observable exogenous shocks gt and ut and on xt–1:
it = ψx xt–1 + ψg gt + ψu ut,   (7)
where the optimal coefficients are determined by the structural 
parameters and the policy objective function. The coefficients ψi are 
chosen to neutralize the effects of aggregate demand shocks, gt, and 
to strike the optimal balance between output and inflation effects for 
inflation shocks, ut. The dependence of it on xt–1 is optimally chosen 
to take advantage of the effects on expectations of commitment to a 
rule.9
Expectations-based optimal rules are advocated in Evans and 
Honkapohja (2003c, 2006) because, as further discussed below, 
fundamentals-based optimal rules are often unstable under learning. 
If private expectations are observable, they can be incorporated into 
the interest rate rule. When this is done appropriately, the rational 
expectations equilibrium will be stable under learning and optimal 
policy can thus be successfully implemented. The essence of these 
rules is that they do not assume rational expectations on the part of 
private agents, but are designed to feed back on private expectations 
in such a way that they generate convergence to the optimal rational 
expectations equilibrium under learning. (If expectations are rational, 
these rules deliver the optimal equilibrium.)
The optimal expectations-based rule under commitment is
it = δL xt−1 + δπ Et
*πt+1 + δx Et
*xt+1+ δg gt + δu ut.  (8)
9. The coefficients of the interest rate rule (7) are ψϕ π xx x bb b =− +
− [( )] ,
1 1  ψg = ϕ−1, 
and ψϕ ρρ π π u x x bb cc =+ +− +
− [( )] .
1 1  Here bx =− −
− () [( )]
/ 2 4
12 12 βςςβ  with ζ = 1 + β + λ2/α, 
and b bx π αλ =− (/)( ), 1  cb x =− ++ −
− [( )( /) ], λβ βρ αλ π 1
1  cc x π αλ =− (/).34 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja


























This rule is obtained by combining the IS curve equation (1), the 
price-setting equation (2), and the first order optimality condition (6), 
treating private expectations as given.10
Interest rate rules based on observations of xt and πt that (outside 
the rational expectations equilibrium) only approximate the first-order 
optimality condition (6) are considered by Svensson and Woodford 
(2005). They suggest a set of hybrid rules, the simplest of which 
would be
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(10)
where θ > 0. This rule combines the fundamentals-based rule of 
equation (7) with the correction for the first-order condition.11 Rule 
(10) delivers the optimal equilibrium under rational expectations. 
McCallum and Nelson (2004) suggest another hybrid rule, which 
takes the form 












() , 1  
(11)
where θ > 0.
2. deTerMinaCy and sTabiliTy Under learning
Given an interest rate rule, we can obtain the reduced form of the 
model and study its properties under rational expectations. Two basic 
properties of interest are determinacy of the rational expectations 
10. Under optimal discretionary policy the first-order condition is λπt + αxt = 0, 
and the coefficients are identical except that δL = 0. The discretionary case is analyzed 
in Evans and Honkapohja (2003c).
11. The model and the interest rate rule analyzed in Svensson and Woodford (2005) 
incorporate additional information lags.35 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
solution and stability under learning of the rational expectations 
equilibrium.
Consider the system given by equations (1), (2), and (3) and one of 
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the reduced form can be written as 
yt = MEt
*yt+1 + Nyt−1 + Pvt,  (12)
for appropriate matrices M, N, and P. In the case of policy rule (4), 
we have N = 0 and thus the simpler system 
yt = MEt
*yt+1 + Pvt.   (13)
We now briefly describe the concepts of determinacy/indeterminacy 
and stability under adaptive (least squares) learning using the general 
frameworks of equations (12) and (13).
The first issue of concern is whether under rational expectations 
the system possesses a unique stationary equilibrium, in which 
case the model is said to be determinate. The model is said to be 
indeterminate if it has multiple stationary solutions. These multiple 
solutions include sunspot solutions, in which the rational expectations 
equilibrium depends on extraneous random variables that influence 
the economy solely through agents’ expectations.12
The second issue concerns stability under adaptive learning. In 
the introduction, we stressed the principle of cognitive consistency 
according to which agents in the model are assumed to behave like 
econometricians or statisticians when they form their expectations. 
In the next section, this approach is formalized in terms of the 
perceived law of motion (PLM) describing the agents’ beliefs. These 
beliefs concern the stochastic process followed by the endogenous 
(and exogenous) variables that need to be forecasted. The parameters 
12. If the model is indeterminate, one can ask whether the sunspot solutions are 
stable under learning. For a general discussion see Evans and Honkapohja (2001). In 
general, different forms of sunspot solutions exist, and stability under learning can 
depend on the particular representation; see Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) and Evans 
and McGough (2005b).36 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
of the PLM are updated using an appropriate statistical technique, 
called an adaptive learning rule, and forecasts are made using the 
estimated PLM at each moment of time. If private agents follow an 
adaptive learning rule like recursive least squares to update the 
parameters of their forecasting model, will the rational expectations 
solution of interest be stable—that is, will it be reached asymptotically 
by the learning process? If not, the rational expectations equilibrium 
is unlikely to be attained. This is the focus of the papers by Bullard 
and Mitra (2002, 2007), Evans and Honkapohja (2003c, 2006), and 
many others.
2.1 Digression on Methodology
Consider first the simpler reduced-form equation (13) under 
rational expectations. For determinacy to hold, both eigenvalues of 
the 2 × 2 matrix M must lie inside the unit circle. In the determinate 
case, the unique stationary solution will be of the minimal state 
variable (MSV) form: 
yc v tt = ,
where c is a 2 × 2 matrix that is easily computed. If, instead, one or 
both roots lie inside the unit circle, then the model is indeterminate. 
There will still be a solution of the MSV form, but there will also be 
other stationary solutions.
Next, we consider the system under learning. Suppose that agents 
believe that the solution is of the form 
yt = a + cvt,  (14)
while the the 2 × 1 vector a and the the 2 × 2 matrix c are not known 
but instead are estimated by the private agents. Equation (14) is the 
PLM of the agents. We include an intercept vector because, although 
we have translated all variables to have zero means for theoretical 
simplicity, in practice agents will need to estimate intercepts as well 
as slope parameters.13
13. Private agents and the policymaker are here assumed to observe the shocks 
vt. If vt is not observable then the PLM would be adjusted to reflect relevant available 
information.37 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
With this PLM and parameter estimates (a, c), agents would form 
expectations as 
Et
*yt+1 = a + cFvt, 
where F is either known or also estimated. Inserting these expectations 
into eqauation (13) and solving for yt, we get the implied actual law 
of motion (ALM), that is, the law that yt would follow for a fixed PLM 
(a, c).14 This is given by 
yt = Ma + (P + McF)vt.
We have thus obtained an associated mapping from PLM to ALM, 
given by 
T(a, c) = (Ma, P + McF)vt,
and the rational expectations solution (0, c) is a fixed point of this map.
Under real-time learning, the sequence of events is as 
follows.15 Private agents begin period t with estimates (at, ct) of 
the PLM parameters computed on the basis of data through t – 1. 
Next, exogenous shocks vt are realized, and private agents form 
expectations Et
*yt+1 = at + ctFvt (assuming for convenience that F 
is known). Following, for example, policy rule (4), the central bank 
sets the interest rate it, and yt is generated according to equations 
(1) and (2) together with the interest rate rule. This temporary 
equilibrium is summarized by equation (13). At the beginning of 
t + 1 agents add the new data point to their information set to 
update their parameter estimates to (at+1, ct+1) using least squares, 
for example, and the process continues. The question of interest is 
whether (at, ct) → (0, c) over time.
It turns out that the answer to this question is given by the 




(,)( ,) (,), ac Taca c =−
14. The ALM describes the temporary equilibrium for given expectations, as 
specified by the forecasts from the given PLM.
15. Formal analysis of learning and E-stability for multivariate linear models is 
provided in Evans and Honkapohja (2001, chap. 10).38 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
where τ denotes notional time. If the rational expectations 
equilibrium (0,  c) is locally asymptotically stable under this 
differential equation, then the equilibrium is stable under least 
squares and closely related learning rules. Conditions for local 
stability of this differential equation are known as expectational 
stability or E-stability conditions. We also refer to these stability 
conditions as the conditions for stability under adaptive learning, 
the conditions for stability under learning, or the conditions for 
learnability of the equilibrium.
For the reduced-form equation (13), it can be shown that the 
two E-stability conditions are that the eigenvalues of M have real 
parts less than one and that all products of eigenvalues of M times 
eigenvalues of F have real parts less than one. It follows that for 
this reduced form, the conditions for stability under adaptive 
learning are implied by determinacy, but not vice versa.16 This is 
not, however, a general result: sometimes E-stability is a stricter 
requirement than determinacy, and in other cases neither condition 
implies the other.
Consider next the reduced-form equation (12). Standard 
techniques are available to determine whether the model is 
determinate.17 In the determinate case, the unique stationary 
solution takes the MSV form 
yt = a + byt−1 + cvt,   (15)
for appropriate values (a, b, c) = (0, b, c). In the indeterminate case, 
there are multiple solutions of this form, as well as non-MSV rational 
expectations equilibrium.
To examine stability under learning, we treat equation (15) as 
the agents’ PLM. Under real-time learning, agents estimate the 
coefficients a, b, c of equation (15). This is a vector autoregression 
(VAR) with exogenous variables vt. The estimates (at, bt, ct) are 
updated at each point in time by recursive least squares. Once again 
it can be shown that the E-stability principle gives the conditions for 
local convergence of real-time learning.
16. See McCallum (2007) for conditions when determinacy implies E-stability.
17. The procedure is to rewrite the model in first-order form and compare the 
number of nonpredetermined variables with the number of roots of the forward-looking 
matrix that lie inside the unit circle.39 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
For E-stability, we compute the mapping from the PLM to the 
ALM as follows. The expectations corresponding to equation (15) are 
given by 
Et
*yt+1 = a + b(a + byt−1 + cvt) + cFvt,  (16)
where we are treating the information set available to the agents, when 
forming expectations, as including vt and yt–1 but not yt. (Alternative 
information assumptions would be straightforward to consider.) This 
leads to the mapping from PLM to ALM given by 
T(a,b,c) = [M(I + b)a, Mb2 + N, M(bc + cF) + P],  (17)
E-stability is again determined by the differential equation 
d
dτ
(,,) (,,) (,,) , abcT abca bc =−   (18)
and the E-stability conditions govern stability under least squares 
learning.
2.2 Results for Monetary Policy
We now describe the determinacy and stability results for the 
interest rate rules described in section 1.
2.2.1 Taylor rules
Bullard and Mitra (2002) consider Taylor-type rules and find that 
the results are sensitive to whether the it rule conditions on current, 
lagged or expected future output and inflation. In addition to assuming 
that χπ, χx ≥ 0, they assume that the serial correlation parameters in 
F are nonnegative. The results are particularly straightforward and 
natural for policy rule (4).18 Bullard and Mitra (2002) show that the 
rational expectations equilibrium is determinate and stable under 
learning if and only if (using our notation) 
18. Throughout we assume that we are not exactly on the border of the regions of 
determinacy or stability.40 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
λ(χπ − 1) + (1 − β)χx > 0. 
In particular, determinacy and stability are guaranteed if policy obeys 
the Taylor principle that χπ > 1, so that nominal interest rates respond 
at least one for one with inflation.
The situation is more complicated if lagged or forward-looking 
Taylor rules are used, and full analytical results are not available. For 
the lagged variable case, they find that for χπ > 1 and a sufficiently 
small χx > 0, the policy leads to a rational expectations equilibrium 
that is determinate and stable under learning. For χπ > 1 but χx too 
large, the system is explosive.
Bullard and Mitra (2002) also look at forward-looking versions of 
the Taylor rule, taking the form 
it = χπEt
*πt+1 + χxEt
*xt+1,   (19)
where χπ, χx > 0 and where we can interpret Et
*πt+1 and Et
*xt+1 as 
identical one-step-ahead forecasts, based on least-squares updating, 
used by both private agents and policymakers. They find that for 
χπ > 1 and a sufficiently small χx > 0, the policy leads to a rational 
expectations equilibrium that is determinate and stable under 
learning. Now for χπ > 1 and a large χx, the system is indeterminate, 
yet the MSV solution is stable under learning. E-stable sunspot 
equilibria are also possible, however, as shown by Honkapohja and 
Mitra (2004) and discussed further by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004) 
and Evans and McGough (2005a).
The Bullard and Mitra (2002) results emphasize the importance 
of the Taylor principle in obtaining stable and determinate interest 
rate rules.19 At the same time, their results show that stability 
under learning must not be taken for granted, even when the system 
is determinate so that a unique stationary solution exists. The 
policymaker must appropriately select the parameters of the policy 
rule, χπ, χx, when an instrument rule describes policy. Stability under 
learning provides a constraint for this choice.
19. Bullard and Mitra (2007) extend their analysis to include interest rate inertia, 
while Kurozumi (2006) considers modifications to the determinacy and E-stability 
results when the model structure is varied. Mitra (2003) examines performance of the 
related case of nominal income targeting.41 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
2.2.2 Optimal monetary policy
Evans and Honkapohja (2006) focus on optimal monetary policy 
under commitment. It turns out that under the fundamentals-based 
policy rule (7), the economy is invariably unstable under learning. 
This is the case even though this rule yields regions in which 
the optimal rational expectations equilibrium is determinate.20 
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Since typically β + λϕ > 1, upward mistakes in Et
*πt+1 lead to higher πt, 
both directly and indirectly through lower ex ante real interest rates, 
which under learning sets off a cumulative movement away from the 
rational expectations equilibrium. The feedback from xt–1 under the 
fundamentals-based it rule with commitment (7) does not stabilize the 
economy. Figure 1 shows how divergence from the optimal rational 
expectations equilibrium occurs under rule (7).21 The instability of 
the fundamentals-based rules, which are designed to obtain optimal 
policy, serves as a strong warning to policymakers not to automatically 
assume that rational expectations will be attained. It is necessary 
to examine explicitly the robustness of contemplated policy rules to 
private agent learning.
In Evans and Honkapohja (2003c, 2006), we show how the 
problems of instability and indeterminacy can be overcome if private 
agents’ expectations are observable, so that interest rate rules can be 
partly conditioned on these expectations. In Evans and Honkapohja 
(2006), we show that under rule (8), the economy is determinate and 
the optimal rational expectations equilibrium is stable under private 
agent learning for all possible structural parameter values. The key 
to the stability results can be seen from the reduced form, 
20. The learning stability results are sensitive to the detailed information 
assumptions. With the PLM equation (15), if agents can make forecasts conditional also 
on yt, then there are regions of both stability and instability under the fundamentals-
based rule, depending on the structural parameters.
21. Figures 1 and 2 are based on the calibration by McCallum and Nelson (1999). 
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In equation (21), the feedback from inflation expectations to actual 
inflation is stabilizing since the coefficient αβ / (α + λ2) is less than 
one and the influence of xt–1 is also weak. Deviations from rational 
expectations are thus offset by policy in such a way that under 
learning private agents are guided over time to form expectations 
consistent with the optimal equilibrium. Our expectations-based rule 
obeys a form of the Taylor principle, since δπ > 1. Figure 2 illustrates 
convergence of learning under rule (8).
Our optimal policy rule is conditioned on both private expectations 
and observable exogenous shocks, as well as lagged output. Moreover, 
when computing the optimal expectations-based rule, the central 
bank must use the correct structural model of the IS and price setting 
relationships, which in turn depend on the specific form of boundedly 
rational individual behavior. For example, the form of the optimal 
expectations-based rule would be different if agents followed the long-
horizon decision rules considered by Preston (2005, 2006).
Variations of fundamentals-based rules can perform well in some 
cases, at least for a relevant region of structural parameter values. 
Figure 1. Instability with a Fundamentals-Based Rule
Source: Authors’ calculations.43 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
For the hybrid rule suggested by Svensson and Woodford (2005), 
numerical analysis shows that, in calibrated models, rule (10) yields 
both determinacy and stability under learning for sufficiently high 
values of θ. Similarly, the hybrid rule suggested by McCallum and 
Nelson (2004) appears to deliver E-stability of the rational expectations 
equilibrium. Another favorable case emerges if policy objective (5) is 
extended to include a motive for interest rate stabilization. Duffy and 
Xiao (2007b) show that in this case an optimal Taylor-type rule can 
deliver determinacy and E-stability for a region of parameter values 
Figure 2. Stability with an Expectations-Based Rule
A. Deviation of x from rational expectations
B. Deviation of π from rational expectations
Source: Authors’ calculations.44 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
that includes the usual calibrations used in the literature. We comment 
further below on stability with constant-gain learning for operational 
versions of these rules.
Finally, some researchers have proposed monetary policy 
formulations other than interest rate rules. For example, policy could 
be formulated as a money supply rule, such as the Friedman proposal 
for k percent money growth. Evans and Honkapohja (2003d) show that 
Friedman’s rule always delivers determinacy and E-stability in the 
standard New-Keynesian model, but it does not perform well in terms 
of the policy objective function. Dennis and Ravenna (2008) examine 
stability of the economy under optimal discretionary policy, formulated 
as a targeting rule, for different forms of private agent learning.
2.3 Some Practical Concerns
Many of the it rules discussed above may not be operational, as 
discussed in McCallum (1999). For example, McCallum and Nelson 
(2004) note that it may be unrealistic to assume that policymakers 
can condition policy on current xt and πt. Similarly, policymakers may 
not have access to accurate observations on private expectations. We 
consider these points in reverse order. In the subsequent discussion, 
we focus on the expectations-based rule (8), the Taylor rule (4), and 
the hybrid rules (10) and (11).
2.3.1 Observability of private expectations
The expectations-based rule (8) requires observations of current 
private expectations of future variables. While survey data on private 
forecasts of future inflation and various measures of future output 
exist, there are concerns about the accuracy of this data. If observations 
of expectations are subject to a white noise measurement error, then 
our stability and determinacy results are unaffected. Furthermore, 
if measurement errors are small, then the policy will be close to 
optimal. If measurement errors are large, however, then this will 
lead to a substantial deterioration in performance. In this case, one 
might consider substituting a proxy for such observations. Since we 
are assuming that private agents forecast by running VARs, the most 
natural proxy is for the central bank to estimate corresponding VARs 
and use these in equation (8).
Suppose now that agents and the central bank begin with different 
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sets with different initial dates. When the private agents and the 
central bank are separately estimating and forecasting VARs, we must 
distinguish between their expectations. An extended E-stability analysis 
for economies with heterogenous expectations gives the conditions for 
convergence of heterogeneous learning, as shown in Honkapohja and 
Mitra (2006). Honkapohja and Mitra (2005b) analyze this issue for the 
case of optimal discretionary policy and expectations-based interest 
rate rules. Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) show that using VAR proxies 
can also achieve convergence to the optimal rational expectations 
equilibrium with commitment. Finally, Muto (2008) considers the 
consequences of learning from the published central bank’s forecast.
The form of the extended E-stability conditions for heterogeneous 
learning depends on the nature of heterogeneity among agents. If the 
heterogeneities are transient (in the sense described in Honkapohja 
and Mitra, 2006), then the standard E-stability conditions directly 
apply. In cases of persistent heterogeneity, the learning stability 
conditions are somewhat sensitive to the detailed assumptions. 
Additional restrictions are required for stability in some cases, such 
as when private agents estimate parameters using stochastic gradient 
techniques while the central bank uses least squares.
2.3.2 Unavailability of current data
A difficulty with the standard Taylor rule (equation 4), as well 
as the hybrid rules of Svensson and Woodford (2005) and McCallum 
and Nelson (2004), is that they presuppose that the policymaker can 
observe both the current output gap and inflation when setting the 
interest rate. McCallum (1999) has criticized such policy rules as not 
being operational. In the case of the Taylor rule, Bullard and Mitra 
(2002) show that this problem of unobservability can be avoided by 
the use of “nowcasts” Et
*yt in place of the actual data yt. Determinacy 
and E-stability conditions are not affected by this modification.
For the hybrid rules, performance depends on the rule. Numerical 
analysis suggests that E-stability can still be achieved for the 
Svensson-Woodford rule under standard values of the parameters. 
The situation is more complex for the McCallum-Nelson rule. 
McCallum and Nelson (2004) suggest using forward expectations in 
place of actual data. Doing so, however, means that determinacy and 
stability under learning are no longer guaranteed, and sufficiently 
large values of the policy parameter θ induce both instability under 
learning and indeterminacy. This is unfortunate since large values 46 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
of θ are needed to achieve a close approximation to optimal policy. 
Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) argue that the loss in welfare relative 
to the optimum is significant if θ is required to satisfy the constraints 
of E-stability and determinacy.
An additional issue with stability under learning arises when 
current data are unobservable to the policymaker. If private agents 
are using constant-gain learning (see section 4.2 for details), the 
stability conditions are more demanding. As discussed in Evans and 
Honkapohja (2008), the hybrid rules suggested by Svensson and 
Woodford (2005) and McCallum and Nelson (2004), as well as the 
Taylor-type optimal rule of Duffy and Xiao (2007b), are subject to the 
problem of instability under constant-gain learning for many realistic 
gain parameter values.
2.3.3 Imperfect knowledge of structural parameters
A third practical concern is that the use of optimal rules requires 
knowledge of the true values of the structural parameters on the 
part of the central bank. Evans and Honkapohja (2003a, 2003c) 
extend the basic analysis to a situation in which the central bank 
estimates the structural parameters ϕ and λ in equations (1) and (2) 
and in each period uses the current estimates in its optimal interest 
rate rule.22 The basic results concerning optimal interest rate rules 
extend naturally to this situation. The fundamental-based rules under 
commitment and discretion are not learnable, while the corresponding 
expectations-based rules deliver convergence of simultaneous learning 
by the private agents and the central bank.
Since optimal monetary policy depends on structural parameters, 
uncertainty about their values is an issue, even if the central bank can 
learn their values asymptotically. Evans and McGough (2007) examine 
optimal Taylor-type rules based on Bayesian model averaging, where 
determinacy and stability under learning are imposed across all 
plausible structural parameter values.
Orphanides and Williams (2007) also stressed the importance 
of structural uncertainty. Their model incorporates both imperfect 
knowledge about the natural rates of interest and unemployment and 
constant-gain learning by private agents. They emphasize monetary 
policy rules that are robust along all of these dimensions.
22. It is natural to assume that the central bank knows the discount factor, β, and 
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3. fUrTher developMenTs
A great deal of recent work extends the results on monetary policy 
and learning. One of the more significant issues, from an applied 
point of view, is the incorporation of constant-gain or perpetual 
learning, in which private agents update estimates using least 
squares, but discount past data. Consequently, agents’ expectations 
never fully converge to the rational expectations equilibrium, but 
they are (asymptotically) in a neighborhood of the equilibrium, 
provided the equilibrium is stable. Several papers discuss the issue 
of optimal policy when the learning process itself is incorporated into 
the optimal policy problem, either during the learning transition 
or under perpetual learning (Orphanides and Williams, 2005a, 
2007; Molnar and Santoro, 2006; Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin, 2005, 
2006). A related issue studied by Ferrero (2007) concerns speed of 
convergence of learning for alternative policy rules. Arifovic, Bullard, 
and Kostyshyna (2007) consider the implications of social learning 
for monetary policy rules.
Extensions of the learning stability results to open economy 
and multi-country settings have been made by Llosa and Tuesta 
(2008), Bullard and Schaling (2006), Bullard and Singh (2006), 
Zanna (2006), and Wang (2006), among others. These papers 
examine both Taylor-type rules and interest rate rules that target 
real exchange rates. Another extension of the basic model considers 
determinacy and E-stability of rational expectations equilibrium 
when long-term interest rates are introduced to the model (see 
McGough, Rudebusch, and Williams, 2005; Tesfaselassie, Schaling, 
and Eijffinger, 2008).
In the standard New-Keynesian model, monetary policy works 
entirely via the demand side. Kurozumi (2006) and Llosa and Tuesta 
(2007) consider how determinacy and learning conditions are altered 
when monetary policy has direct effects on inflation. Kurozumi 
and van Zandweghe (2008b) extend the analysis to the model with 
search in labor markets, while Wieland (2008) analyzes the role of 
endogenous indexation for inflation targeting. Kurozumi and van 
Zandweghe (2008a), Duffy and Xiao (2007a), and Pfajfar and Santoro 
(2007a) examine in detail how the learning stability conditions for 
Taylor rules are modified when capital is incorporated into the 
New-Keynesian model. The results for models with capital depend 
on precisely how capital is modeled, that is, on whether adjustment 
costs are included and whether there is firm-specific capital or a 48 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
rental market for capital. One result that emerges in some of these 
settings is that determinacy and E-stability require the interest rate 
rule to have a positive response to the output gap.
Learning plays a key role in a number of detailed policy issues. 
Some central banks often set monetary policy based on the constant 
interest rate that is expected to deliver a target inflation rate over 
a specified horizon. Honkapohja and Mitra (2005a) explore how this 
affects stability under learning. Transparency and communication of 
targets and rules are further considered by Berardi and Duffy (2007) 
and Eusepi and Preston (2007).
While the New-Keynesian model is based on a linearized set-up 
under Calvo-type pricing, nonlinear settings based on quadratic costs 
of price adjustments suggested by Rotemberg (1982) have been useful 
for studying the possibility of liquidity trap equilibria.23 Benhabib, 
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001) investigate this issue under perfect 
foresight. Evans and Honkapohja (2005) analyze this set-up under 
learning for the case of flexible prices, while Evans, Guse, and 
Honkapohja (2008) focus on a sticky-price version. The latter paper is 
discussed further below. Sticky-information models that incorporate 
learning have also been developed (Branch and others, 2007, 2008).
A number of theoretical learning topics have recently been pursued 
that have a bearing on monetary policy issues. Forward-looking Taylor 
rules can generate indeterminacy for some choices of parameters. 
In these cases, can stationary sunspot equilibria be stable under 
learning? Honkapohja and Mitra (2004), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004), 
and Evans and McGough (2005a) examine this issue in the New-
Keynesian setting, where conditions for stable sunspots are obtained 
in linearized models, while Eusepi (2007) looks at the question in a 
nonlinear setting. Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon (2007) show that 
stable sunspot equilibria can arise in a cash-in-advance framework in 
which part of the government deficit is financed by seigniorage.
Constant-gain learning raises the issue of the appropriate choice 
of gain parameter (see Evans and Honkapohja, 1993, 2001, chap. 14; 
Marcet and Nicolini, 2003). Evans and Ramey (2006) consider this 
problem in a simple monetary set-up in which private agents face an 
unknown regime-switching process. This paper shows how the Lucas 
critique, based on rational expectations, can carry over to learning 
dynamics in which agents have misspecified models.
23. Bullard and Cho (2005) study the possibility of liquidity traps under learning 
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A number of papers model monetary policy with near-rational 
expectations. Woodford (2005) develops a min-max concept of policy 
robustness in which policymakers protect against agents’ expectations 
being distorted away from rational expectations within some class of 
near rational expectations. Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2008) 
consider the possibility that expert judgement based on extraneous 
factors believed to be present can become almost self-fulfilling. 
They show how to alter monetary policy to protect against these 
near-rational exuberance equilibria. Heterogeneous expectations is 
another area that is increasingly receiving attention. Theoretical 
work on monetary policy that allows for learning heterogeneity across 
private agents, or between policymakers and private agents, includes 
Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon (2001), Giannitsarou (2003), and 
Honkapohja and Mitra (2005b, 2006). Guse (2008) and Berardi (2008) 
introduce misspecified expectations to the New-Keynesian model, 
while Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2008) introduce robustness 
considerations to the analysis of stability. A related approach 
emphasizes that private agents may have different types of predictors, 
with the proportions of agents using the different forecast methods 
changing over time according to relative forecast performance 
(see Brock and Hommes, 1997; Branch and Evans, 2006b). For an 
application to monetary inflation models and monetary policy, see 
Branch and Evans (2007) and Brazier and others (2008).
Empirical applications of learning to macroeconomics and 
monetary policy include Bullard and Eusepi (2005) and Orphanides 
and Williams (2005b), who look at estimated models that focus on the 
explanation of the large increase in inflation rates in the 1970s. Milani 
(2005, 2007) incorporates learning as a way to explain persistence 
in New-Keynesian models, using U.S. data. The first attempts to 
incorporate learning to applied dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models have recently been undertaken by Slobodyan and 
Wouters (2007) and Murray (2007). Several papers use least-squares 
learning models or dynamic predictors to explain expectations data, 
including Branch (2004), Branch and Evans (2006a), Orphanides and 
Williams (2005c), Basdevant (2005), Pfajfar (2007), and Pfajfar and 
Santoro (2007b).
Other important empirical learning papers include Marcet and 
Nicolini (2003), which studies hyperinflation in South American 
countries (we discuss this paper in detail below). In addition, Cogley 
and Sargent (2005), Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006), Primiceri 
(2006), Ellison and Yates (2007), and Carboni and Ellison (2007, 2008) 50 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
emphasize the importance of policymaker model uncertainty and the 
role of central bank learning in explaining the historical evolution of 
inflation and unemployment in the post-1950 period.
In the next sections we discuss four recent topics that address 
important applied questions. Learning plays a crucial role in these 
analyses, but the main focus in each case goes well beyond the stability 
of rational expectations equilibrium under learning.
4. perpeTUal learning and persisTenCe
The preceding sections were concerned with the stability of the 
rational expectations equilibrium under least squares (LS) learning. 
That is, we used LS learning to assess whether a rational expectations 
equilibrium is attainable if we model agents as econometricians. 
Orphanides and Williams (2005a) show that taking the further step of 
replacing (“decreasing gain”) LS learning with constant-gain learning 
has important implications for monetary policy, even if the equilibrium 
is stable under learning.
Orphanides and Williams work with a simple two-equation 
macroeconomic model. The first equation is a new classical 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve with inertia:
πφ πφ πα t t
e
ttt ye + + ++ =+ −+ + 1 1 11 1 () ,  (22)
where πt+1 is the rate of inflation between period t and period t + 1, 
πt
e
+1 is the rate of inflation over this period expected at time t, yt+1 is 
the level of the output gap in t + 1, et+1 is a white noise inflation shock, 
and (1 – φ)πt represents intrinsic inflation persistence. We assume 
0 < φ < 1.
The second equation is an aggregate demand relation that 
embodies a lagged policy effect:
yt+1 = xt + ut+1. 
Here, xt is set by monetary policy at t, and ut+1 is white noise. Through 
monetary policy it is assumed that one period ahead, policymakers 
are able to control aggregate output up to the unpredictable random 
disturbance ut+1. This equation basically replaces the IS and LM 
curves. It is convenient for the task at hand, but suppresses issues of 
monetary control.51 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
4.1 Optimal Policy under Rational Expectations
At time t the only state variable is πt. Policymakers have a target 
inflation rate, π*, and care about the deviation of πt from π*. Their 
instrument is xt, and they are assumed to follow a rule of the form,
xt = −θ(πt − π*).  (23)
Policymakers also care about the output gap, yt+1. Since stable inflation 
requires Eyt = 0, policymakers are assumed to choose θ to minimize
L = (1 − ω)Eyt
2 + ωE(πt − π*)2.
This is a standard quadratic loss function. We can think of ω as 
reflecting policymakers preferences, which may (or may not) be derived 
from the preferences of the representative agent.
Under rational expectations, ππ t
e
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2, it is straightforward to minimize L 
over θ to get θP, the optimal choice of θ under rational expectations. 
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and that θP is increasing in both ω and in the degree of inertia, 1 – φ. 
Varying ω leads to an efficiency frontier, described by a familiar trade-
off between σπ and σy, which is sometimes called the Taylor curve. 
For this choice of feedback parameter, in the rational expectations 
equilibrium inflation follows the process
ππ t
PP




t π π + =+ 101 ,
where c
PP
0 1 =− αθ φ /( ) and c
P P
1 11 =− − [/ ( )]. αθ φ  Here noiset is white 
noise. The superscript P refers to perfect knowledge, which Orphanides 
and Williams use as a synonym for rational expectations.
The problem is thus quite straightforward under rational 
expectations. How “aggressive”policy should be with respect 
to deviations of inflation from target depends naturally on the 
structural parameters φ and α and on the policymaker preferences 
as described by ω.
4.2 Least-Squares Learning
We now make the crucial step of backing away from rational 
expectations. Instead of assuming that agents are endowed a priori with 
rational expectations, we model the agents as forecasting in the same 
way that an econometrician might: by assuming a simple time series 
model for the variable of interest, estimating its parameters, and using 
the estimated model to forecast. Specifically, suppose private agents 
believe that inflation follows a first-order autoregressive, or AR(1), 
process, as it does in a rational expectations equilibrium, but that they 




1 . Instead they estimate the parameters of 
πt = c0 + c1πt + vt 
by a least-squares-type regression, and at time t they forecast
π π t
e
tt t cc + =+ 10 1 ,, .
The estimates c0,t, c1,t are updated as new data become available. 
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literally do least squares using all the data. We assume that 
policymakers do not explicitly take account of private agent learning 
and follow the feedback rule with θ = θP. Then, with infinite memory 
(that is, no discounting of observations), one can show that
cc cc tt
PP
01 01 ,, ,, →
with probability 1. Asymptotically, we get the optimal rational 
expectations equilibrium.
Orphanides and Williams (2005a) make a small but significant 
change to the standard least squares updating formula. With regular 
LS, each data point counts equally. When expressed in terms of a 
recursive algorithm (that is, recursive least squares, or RLS), the 
coefficient estimates c0,t, c1,t are updated in response to the most 
recent data point with a weight proportion to the sample size 1/t. We 
often say that RLS has a decreasing gain since the gain, or weight, 
on each data point is κt = 1/t, which declines towards 0 as t → ∞. 
Orphanides and Williams instead consider constant-gain RLS, in 
which past data is discounted. In terms of the RLS algorithm, this is 
accomplished technically by setting the gain—the weight on the most 
recent observation used to update estimates—to a small constant, that 
is, by setting κt = κ (for example, 0.05). This is equivalent to using 
weighted least squares with weights declining geometrically in time 
as we move backward from the current date.
Why would it be natural for agents to use a constant rather than 
decreasing gain? The main rationale for this procedure is that it 
allows estimates to remain alert to structural shifts. As economists, 
and as econometricians, we tend to believe that structural changes 
occasionally occur, and we might therefore assume that private 
agents also recognize and allow for this. Although in principle one 
might attempt to model the process of structural change, this tends to 
unduly strain the amount of knowledge we have about the economic 
structure. A reasonable alternative is to adjust parameter estimators 
to reflect the fact that recent observations convey more accurate 
information on the economy’s law of motion than do data further in 
the past, and constant-gain estimators are one very natural way of 
accomplishing this down-weighting of past data. Another approach 
that is sometimes used in practice is to implement a rolling data-
window of finite length.24
24. Honkapohja and Mitra (2003) discuss the implications of bounded memory as 
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4.3 Implications of Constant-Gain Least Squares
With constant-gain procedures, estimates no longer fully converge 
to the rational expectations equilibrium. The estimators c0,t, c1,t 
converge instead to a stochastic process. Orphanides and Williams 
(2005a) therefore use the term perpetual learning to refer to the 
constant-gain case.
If the gain parameter κ is very small, then estimators will be close 
to the equilibrium values most of the time with a high probability, and 
output and inflation will be near their equilibrium paths. Nonetheless, 
small plausible values like κ = 0.05 can lead to very different outcomes 
in the calibrations Orphanides and Williams consider. They analyze 
the results using simulations, with φ = 0.75 and α = 0.25. They consider 
θ ∈ {0.1, 0.6, 1.0}, which corresponds to weights ω = 0.01, 0.50, and 
1.00, respectively, under rational expectations.
Their main findings are threefold. First, the standard deviations 
of c0,t and c1,t are large even though forecast performance remains 
good. Second, the persistence of inflation increases substantially, 
compared with the rational expectations equilibrium, as measured by 
the AR(1) coefficient for πt. Finally, the policy frontier shifts out very 
substantially and sometimes in a nonmonotonic way.
4.4 Policy Implications
Under perpetual learning by private agents, if policymakers keep 
to the same class of rules,
xt = −θS(πt − π*), 
then they should choose a different θ than under rational expectations. 
Here the notation θS indicates that we restrict policymakers to choosing 
from the same “simple” class of policy rules. There are four main 
implications for policy in the context of constant-gain (perpetual) 
learning by private agents. First, the “naive” policy choice, that is, 
the policy that assumes rational expectations (perfect knowledge) 
on the part of agents, can be strictly inefficient when the agents are, 
in fact, following perpetual learning with κ > 0: there are cases in 
which increasing θS above θP would decrease the standard deviations 
of both inflation and output. Second, policy should generally be more 
hawkish—that is, under perpetual learning the monetary authorities 
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Third, following a sequence of unanticipated inflation shocks, 
inflation doves (that is, policymakers with a low θ, reflecting a low 
ω) can do very poorly, as these shocks can lead expectations to 
temporarily but persistently deviate substantially from rational 
expectations. Finally, if the inflation target, π*, is known to private 
agents, so that they need estimate only the slope parameter c1 
using the PLM,
πt+1 − π* = c1(πt − π*) + vt+1, 
then the policy frontier is more favorable than when the intercept c0 is 
not known. One way to interpret this is that central bank transparency 
is useful.
Figure 3 indicates how the performance of policy depends on 
expectations formation and what the policymaker assumes about it. 
The middle curve is the efficient policy under learning, while “naive” 
refers to the case in which policy presumes rational expectations while 
agents are in fact learning with gain κ = 0.05.
Figure 3. The Policymaker’s Loss
Source: Authors’ drawing, adapted from Orphanides and Wiliams (2005a), figure 7.
Perpetual learning thus turns out to have major implications 
for policy, even when the deviation from the rational expectations 
equilibrium might not be thought to be too large. The main policy 
implication is that with perpetual learning, there should be a policy 
bias toward hawkishness. The intuition for this result that a more 
hawkish policy (high θ) helps to keep inflation expectations, πt
e
+1, 56 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
in line, or closer to rational expectations values. This qualitative 
result also emerges in the more general setting in Orphanides and 
Williams (2007).
5. esTiMaTed Models wiTh learning
The Orphanides and Williams (2005a) results suggest another 
implication of learning that goes beyond policy, namely, that learning 
itself can be a source of persistence in macroeconomic dynamics. The 
starting point for this line of thought, as pursued by Milani (2005, 
2007), is that inflation persistence in the data is much higher than 
arises from the basic New-Keynesian model. For a good empirical fit 
to the data, a backward-looking component is needed in the New-
Keynesian Phillips curve under the rational expectations assumption. 
The source of the backward-looking component used in these hybrid 
models, however, is controversial. Milani (2005) considers the question 
of whether learning dynamics can provide some or all of the persistence 
needed to fit the data.
To investigate this, consider the most frequently used modification 
to the basic New-Keynesian model, namely, adding indexation to a 
Calvo price setting; that is, firms that do not optimize in any given 
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where xt is the output gap and γ measures the degree of indexation. 
Earlier work under rational expectations empirically finds values of 
γ that are close to one.
For expectations, we assume a PLM of the form
πt = φ0 + φ1πt−1 + εt, 
and agents at t are assumed to use data {, } 1 0
1 πi
t−  to estimate φ0, φ1 
using constant-gain least squares. For time t estimates φ0,t, φ1,t, the 
agents’ forecasts are given by
Et
*πt+1 = φ0,t + φ1,t Et
*πt
  = φ0,t + φ1,t(φ0,t + φ1,tπt−1),57 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
where we assume that the aggregate inflation rate, πt, is not included 
in the agents information set at the time of their forecasts.

























, , , ()
.
Alternatively, Milani (2005) also considers using real marginal cost 
as the driving variable in place of the output gap, xt. To estimate the 
model for the United States, Milani computes inflation from the GDP 
deflator and the output gap as detrended GDP, while real marginal 
costs are proxied by the deviation of the labor income share from 1960:1 
to 2003:4. Agents’ initial parameter estimates are obtained by using 
presample data from 1951–59.
A two-step procedure is used. First, the PLM is estimated from 
constant-gain learning using an assumed constant gain of κ = 0.015. 
This is in line with earlier empirical estimates. Milani then estimates 
the ALM using nonlinear least squares. This procedure allows 
us to estimate the structural source of persistence, γ, taking into 
account the learning effects. The PLM parameter estimates show 
the following pattern: φ1,t was initially low in the 1950s and 1960s, 
before rising (up to 0.958) and then declining somewhat to values 
above 0.8; φ0,t was also initially low before rising sharply and then 
gradually declining after 1980.
The ALM structural estimates, in particular, generate a degree 
of indexation of γ = 0.139 (with the output gap). The results are fairly 
robust to other choices of gain κ that appear appropriate based on 
Schwartz’s Bayesian information criterion. The estimate of γ is not 
significantly different from zero, and it constrasts sharply with the 
high levels of γ found under the rational expectations assumption. 
It thus appears that the data are consistent with the learning 
interpretation of the sources of persistence for inflation.
Milani (2007) estimates the full New-Keynesian model under 
learning. He finds that the degree of habit persistence is also low in 
the IS curve. This contrasts with the usual extension of the New-
Keynesian model under rational expectations that is often employed 
to improve the empirical fit of the model. Milani’s work can be seen 
as a starting point for the very recent attempts by Slobodyan and 
Wouters (2007) and Murray (2007) to incorporate learning into 
DSGE models.58 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
6. reCUrrenT hyperinflaTions
Marcet and Nicolini (2003) start from the standard hyperinflation 
model with learning and extend it to an open economy setting. 
Their aim is to provide a unified theory to explain the recurrent 
hyperinflations experienced by many countries in the 1980s.
6.1 The Basic Hyperinflation Model
The starting point is the theoretical model sometimes known as 
the seigniorage model of inflation (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001, 
chap. 11). The Cagan model is based on the linear money demand 
equation, which can be obtained from an overlapping generations 
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t  and 0 otherwise. This equation is combined with 
exogenous government purchases, dt > 0, that are entirely financed 
by seigniorage:
Mt = Mt−1 + dtPt.
Rewriting this as Mt/Pt = (Mt−1/Pt−1)( Pt−1/Pt) + d, setting MM t
d
t = , 



























Under perfect foresight (that is, PPPP t
e
ttt + + = 1 1 // ) there are two steady 
states, βL < βH, provided d ≥ 0 is not too large. If d is above a critical 
value, then there are no perfect foresight steady states. There is also 
a continuum of perfect foresight paths converging to βH. Some early 
theorists suggested that these paths might provide an explanation 
for actual hyperinflation episodes.
Consider now the situation under adaptive learning. Suppose the 
PLM is that the inflation process is a steady state, that is, Pt+1 / Pt = β + ηt, 
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Under steady-state learning, agents estimate β based on past average 
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This is simply a recursive algorithm for the average inflation rate, 
which is equivalent to a least-squares regression on a constant.25 The 
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where d is a fixed parameter. Since 0 < T ′(βL) < 1 and T ′(βH) > 1, βL 
is E-stable, and therefore locally stable under learning, while βH is 
not. This is illustrated in figure 4.
Figure 4. Steady-State Learning in the Hyperinflation Model
Source: Authors’ drawing.
25. One can consider more general classes of PLM. Adam, Evans, and Honkapohja 
(2006) study the circumstances in which autoregressive PLMs can converge to 
hyperinflation paths.60 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
An increase in d shifts T (β) up, so the comparative statics of βL 
are natural while those of βH are counterintuitive. This, together with 
the fact that the steady state βH is not stable under learning, suggests 
problems with the rational expectations version of this model as a 
theoretical explanation for hyperinflations.
6.2 Empirical Background
Marcet and Nicolini (2003) list four stylized facts about 
hyperinflation episodes in the 1980s in a number of South American 
countries (as well as some episodes in other places and at other 
times): (1) hyperinflation episodes are recurrent; (2) exchange rate 
rules stop hyperinflations, although new hyperinflations eventually 
occur; (3) during a hyperinflation, seigniorage and inflation are 
not highly correlated; and (4) average inflation and seigniorage are 
strongly positively correlated across countries, with hyperinflations 
only occurring in countries where seigniorage is high, on average. 
Stabilization plans to deal with hyperinflation have been based either on 
heterodox policy (exchange rate rules) or orthodox policy (permanently 
reducing the deficit). Policies that combine both elements appear to 
have been successful in stopping hyperinflations permanently.
6.3 The Marcet-Nicolini Model
Marcet and Nicolini (2003) use an open economy version of the 
overlapping-generations hyperinflation model. This is a flexible price 





f is the foreign price of goods, which is assumed to be 
exogenous. There is a cash-in-advance constraint for local currency on 
net purchases of consumption. This generates the demand by young 
agents for the local currency. Hence, we continue to have the money 
demand equation as in the basic model. Government expenditure, dt, 
is assumed to be i.i.d.
There are two exchange rate regimes. In the floating regime the 
government does not buy or sell foreign exchange, and its budget 
constraint is as in the basic model. There is no foreign trade, and 
the economy behaves just like the closed economy model, with PPP 
determining the price of foreign currency by eP P tt t
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In the exchange rate rule regime, the government buys or sells 
foreign exchange, Rt, as needed to meet a target exchange rate, et. 
Sales of foreign exchange generate revenue in addition to seigniorage 
that the government can use to finance government purchases, 
that is, (Mt – Mt–1)/Pt = dt + [(Rt – Rt–1)et ]/Pt. In equilibrium, any 
increase in reserves must be matched by a trade surplus, that is, 
(Rt – Rt–1)et = TBt⋅Pt, where TBt is total endowment minus total private 
consumption minus dt.
The key question is the form of the exchange rate rule. When 
an exchange rate rule is adopted, it is assumed that the object is 
to stabilize inflation at a targeted rate, β. This is accomplished by 






















Under the exchange rate rule, this last equation determines Pt. Given 
expectations, money demand determines Mt. Reserves, Rt, must then 
adjust to satisfy the flow government budget constraint.
The remaining question is how the government chooses its 
exchange rate regime. We assume there is a maximum inflation rate 
tolerated, βU. The exchange rate regime is imposed only in periods 
when inflation would otherwise exceed this bound (or if no positive 
Pt would otherwise clear the market).
6.4 Learning
Marcet and Nicolini (2003) argue that under rational expectations, 
the model cannot properly explain the stylized facts of hyperinflation 
outlined above. An adaptive learning formulation will be more 
successful. They use a variation of the simple (decreasing gain) 
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with a given β0. Here 1/αt = κt is what we have called the gain, 
αt = αt–1 + 1 corresponds to decreasing gain learning, and αα t => 1 
is a constant-gain algorithm (αt can also be thought of as the effective 
sample size). Marcet and Nicolini consider a version in which agents 
switch between decreasing and constant gain according to recent 
performance. Specifically, 











   






falls below some bound v, and otherwise αα t = .











1 (, ), β
  (24)
where hd













Figure 5 describes the dynamics of system (24).
Figure 5. Inflation as a Function of Expected Inflation
Source: Authors’ drawing, adapted from Marcet and Nicolini (2003), figure 3.63 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
There is a stable region consisting of values of β below the 
unstable high inflation steady state, βH, and an unstable region that 
lies above it. Here we set β = βL, the low inflation steady state. βU 
is set at a value above βH. This gives rise to very natural recurring 
hyperinflation dynamics: starting from βL, a sequence of random 
shocks may push βt into the unstable region, at which point the gain 
is revised upward to 1/α and inflation follows an explosive path until 
it is stabilized by the exchange rate rule. Then the process begins 
again. The model with learning has the following three features. 
First, there may be eventual convergence to rational expectations. 
This can occur if the random shocks/learning dynamics do not push 
βt into the unstable region for a long time. Decreasing gain may 
then lead to asymptotic convergence to βL. Second, a higher E(dt) 
raises both average inflation and the frequency of hyperinflations. 
A combination of orthodox and heterodox policies make sense as 
a way to end hyperinflations. Third, all four stylized facts listed 
above can be matched using this model, and simulations of a 
calibrated model look very plausible. Overall this appears to be 
a very successful application of boundedly rational learning to a 
major empirical issue.
7. liqUidiTy Traps and deflaTionary spirals
Deflation and liquidity traps have been a concern in recent times. 
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) consider issues of liquidity traps 
and deflationary spirals under learning in a New-Keynesian model. 
As we have seen, contemporaneous Taylor-type interest rate rules 
should respond to the inflation rate more than one for one to ensure 
determinacy and stability under learning. As emphasized by Benhabib, 
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001), however, if one considers the 
interest rate rule globally, rather than in a neighborhood of the target 
inflation rate, the requirement that net nominal interest rates must be 
nonnegative implies that the rule must be nonlinear and that, for any 
continuous rule, there exists a second steady state at a lower (possibly 
negative) inflation rate. This is illustrated in figure 6, which shows the 
interest rate policy R = 1 + f(π) as a function of π.26 The straight line in 
the figure is the Fisher equation, R = π/β, which is obtained from the 
usual Euler equation for consumption in a steady state. 
26. Taylor rules usually also include a dependence on aggregate output, which 
we omit for simplicity.64 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
Figure 6. Multiple Steady States with a Global Taylor Rule
Source: Authors’ drawing.
Here we are now using R to stand for the interest rate factor (so 
that the net interest rate is R – 1), and πt = Pt/Pt–1 is the inflation 
factor, so that π – 1 is the net inflation rate. In the figure, π* denotes 
the intended steady state, at which the Taylor principle of a more than 
one-for-one response is satisfied, and πL is the unintended steady state. 
In addition, πL may correspond to either a very low positive inflation 
rate or to a negative net inflation rate, that is, deflation. The zero 
lower bound corresponds to R = 1. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe 
(2001) show that under rational expectations, there is a continuum of 
liquidity trap paths that converge on πL. The pure rational expectations 
analysis thus suggests a serious risk of the economy following these 
liquidity trap paths.
What happens under learning? In Evans and Honkapohja (2005), 
we analyzed a flexible-price perfect competition model. We show that 
deflationary paths are possible, but that the real risk, under learning, 
involves paths in which inflation slips below πL and then continue to 
fall further. For this flexible-price model, we show that this can be 
avoided by a change in monetary policy at low inflation rates. The 
required policy is to switch to an aggressive money supply rule at 
some inflation rate between πL and π*. Such a policy would successfully 
avoid liquidity traps and deflationary paths.
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) reconsider the issues 
in a model that allows for sticky prices and deviations of output 
from flexible-price levels. They consider a representative-agent 
infinite-horizon dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with 65 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
monopolistic competition and price-adjustment costs. Monetary 
policy follows a global Taylor-rule as above. Fiscal policy is standard: 
exogenous government purchases, gt, and Ricardian tax policy that 
depends on real debt level. The model is essentially a New-Keynesian 
model, except that, in line with Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe 
(2001), it has Rotemberg (1982) costs of price adjustment as the friction 
rather than Calvo pricing. The model equations are nonlinear, and 
the nonlinearity in its analysis under learning is retained.
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The first equation is the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, relating πt 
positively to πt
e
+1 and to measures of aggregate activity. The second 
equation is the New-Keynesian IS curve, obtained from the usual 
household Euler equation. When linearized around a steady state, both 
of these equations are identical in form to the standard New-Keynesian 
equations. There are also money and debt evolution equations.
There are two stochastic steady states at πL and πH. If the random 
shocks are i.i.d., then steady-state learning is appropriate for both ce 
and πe, that is,
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where φt is the gain sequence. The main findings are that while 
the intended steady state at π* is locally stable under learning, the 
unintended steady state at πL is unstable under learning. The key 66 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
observation is that πL is a saddlepoint, which implies the existence of 
deflationary spirals under learning. In particular, an expectational 
shock can lead to sufficiently pessimistic expectations, and ce and πe 
will follow paths leading to deflation and stagnation. This is illustrated 
in figure 7, based on E-stability dynamics.
Figure 7. The Dynamics of πe and ce under Normal Policy
Source: Based on Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008), figure 4.
The intuition for the result can be seen by supposing that we are 
initially near the πL steady state and considering a small drop in πe. 
With a fixed R this would lead through the IS curve to a lower c and 
thus through the Phillips curve, to a lower π. A sufficient reduction 
in R would prevent the reductions in c and π, but this is not possible 
since we are close to the zero lower bound, and the global Taylor rule 
here dictates only small reductions in R. The falls in realized c and π 
then leads under learning to reductions in ce and πe, and this sets the 
deflationary spiral in motion.
Thus, under normal policy the intended steady state is not 
globally stable under learning. Large adverse shocks to expectations 
or structural changes can set in motion unstable downward paths. 67 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) show that policy can be altered 
to avoid the deflationary spiral. The recommended policy is to set a 
minimum inflation threshold  π, where πL <  π < π*. For example, if 
the global Taylor rule is chosen so that πL corresponds to deflation, 
then a convenient choice for the threshold would be zero net inflation, 
 π = 1. The authorities would follow normal monetary and fiscal policy 
provided this delivers πt >  π. However, if πt threatens to fall below  π 
under normal policy, then aggressive policies would be implemented 
to ensure that πt =  π: interest rates would be reduced, if necessary 
to near the zero lower bound R = 1, and if this is not sufficient, then 
government purchases, gt, would be increased as required.
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) show that these policies can 
indeed ensure πt ≥  π always under learning, and that incorporating 
aggressive monetary and fiscal policies triggered by an inflation 
threshold  π leads to global stability of the intended steady state at 
π*.27 Perhaps surprisingly, they also show that it is essential to use 
an inflation threshold, since using an output threshold to trigger 
aggressive polices will not always avoid deflationary spirals.
8. ConClUsions
Expectations play a large role in modern macroeconomics. While 
the rational expectations assumption is the natural benchmark, it is 
implausibly demanding. Realistically, it should be assumed that people 
are smart, but boundedly rational. To model bounded rationality, we 
recommend the principle of cognitive consistency: economic agents 
should be about as smart as (good) economists. When economists 
need to make forecasts, they do so using econometric models, so a 
particularly natural choice is to model agents as econometricians.
Convergence to rational expectations is possible in many economic 
models, with an appropriate econometric perceived law of motion. 
However, the stability of rational expectations equilibrium under 
private agent learning is not automatic. Our central message is 
that monetary policy must be designed to ensure both determinacy 
and stability under learning. This observation leads to particular 
choices of interest rate rules, whether we are considering standard 
classes of instrument rules or designing optimal monetary policy. 
Instrument rules that respond appropriately to “nowcasts” perform 
27. For non-Ricardian economies, Bénassy (2007) develops an alternative interest 
rate rule that leads to global uniqueness.68 George W. Evans and Seppo Honkapohja
well in this respect, but implementing optimal policy appears to 
require an appropriate response to private sector expectations about 
the future.
More generally, policymakers need to use policy to guide 
expectations, and the recent literature provides several important 
illustrations. If under learning there are persistent deviations from 
fully rational expectations, then monetary policy may need to respond 
more aggressively to inflation in order to stabilize expectations. 
The learning literature also shows how to guide the economy under 
extreme threats of either hyperinflation or deflationary spirals. As 
we have illustrated, appropriate monetary and fiscal policy design 
can minimize these risks.69 Expectations, Learning, and Monetary Policy: An Overview
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